A Comparative Analysis of HIPAA Security Risk Assessments for Two Small Dental Clinics by Lisbon, Scott
St. Cloud State University
theRepository at St. Cloud State
Culminating Projects in Information Assurance Department of Information Systems
5-2018
A Comparative Analysis of HIPAA Security Risk
Assessments for Two Small Dental Clinics
Scott Lisbon
St. Cloud State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/msia_etds
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Information Systems at theRepository at St. Cloud State. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Culminating Projects in Information Assurance by an authorized administrator of theRepository at St. Cloud State. For more
information, please contact rswexelbaum@stcloudstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisbon, Scott, "A Comparative Analysis of HIPAA Security Risk Assessments for Two Small Dental Clinics" (2018). Culminating












Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
St. Cloud State University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of 













Cyber security risk assessments in the healthcare industry are legally required and 
demand an ongoing investment of time and resources. Small healthcare clinics are less 
likely to have streamlined processes in place to meet these requirements. This work 
presents two case studies featuring qualitative Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) security risk assessments of small dental clinics using the 
free Security Risk Assessment (SRA) tool provided by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services. One clinic used a cloud service provider to safeguard protected health 
information (PHI) while the other used an on-premises server. The data revealed 
detailed information relating to the cyber risk posture of each organization within the 
scope of the HIPAA Security Rule. Analysis included suggestions to mitigate the 
compliance gaps and vulnerabilities within the environment. Based on the data 
gathered, a comparative analysis of using the cloud vs. on-premises to manage PHI 
was conducted to provide insight into the need to balance security with other business 
requirements. This work provides greater context to the process of conducting HIPAA-
compliant security risk assessments, including the responsibilities that small healthcare 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
This work includes HIPAA security risk assessments of two small dental clinics 
using the SRA tool provided by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
One clinic used a cloud service provider (CSP) to safeguard PHI and the other housed 
PHI on-premises. A comparative analysis of the risks between the two clinics was 
conducted which included an evaluation of the pros and cons of housing PHI in the 
cloud. The final section includes an examination of key factors for small business 
owners to consider based on emerging cyber security trends. 
Problem Statement 
 Periodic risk assessments for all healthcare entities which use electronic PHI are 
required under the HIPAA Security Rule as a subset of HIPAA compliance. Risk 
assessments are time-consuming activities which require expertise and significant 
attention to detail. These risks must then be managed and mitigated, as appropriate, in 
a continuous improvement process. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
 Small healthcare clinics are often forgotten in the cyber security landscape and 
typically do not have significant resources to invest in their security program. Yet small 
businesses are a prime target for various cyberattacks which can compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI. This research contributes to addressing 
this resource problem by providing clear insight and direction into these competing 
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challenges that small business owners face in the healthcare space based on some of 
the most recent cyber security trends. 
Objective of the Research 
 The objectives of this research are to help drive the HIPAA compliance 
conversation forward and assist small healthcare entities with developing their cyber 
security risk management programs. 
Research Questions 
 How much time and effort does it take to complete a HIPAA risk assessment 
using the SRA tool? 
 What are the key cyber security responsibilities that healthcare providers must 
own to be HIPAA-compliant and maintain their reputation should a breach occur? 
 What should healthcare providers consider when deciding whether to house PHI 
in the cloud or on-premises? 
Limitations of the Research 
The SRA tool is a guideline for risk assessments and its use does not guarantee 
compliance. The scope of the tool is limited to the HIPAA Security Rule, which is a 
subset of HIPAA compliance. 
Definition of Terms 
 BAA: Business associate agreement. Contract between two businesses for 
service provided, including liability and responsibilities should a breach or other 
security incident occur. 
 Clinic A: Used a cloud service provider to house PHI. 
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 Clinic B: Housed PHI on-premises and included roughly six times more PHI 
records than Clinic A. 
 CSP: Cloud service provider. Can be certified as HIPAA-compliant. 
 HHS: Department of Health and Human Services. They own the SRA tool, 
provide guidance for HIPAA compliance, and administer HIPAA audits and fines. 
 HIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. This law 
governs compliance obligations for healthcare providers, which includes cyber 
security. 
 PHI: Protected health information. Sensitive patient information protected by 
HIPAA law. 
 Small healthcare provider: Less than 50 employees. 
 SRA tool: Security Risk Assessment tool, provided by HHS as a guideline for 
HIPAA Security Rule compliance. 
Summary 
This research aims to provide small healthcare providers with clear guidance to 
fully own the cyber security risks in their clinical environment. The case studies and 
analysis provide examples of the level of detail and time commitment one should expect 







Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides greater context for the problem of conducting a HIPAA 
security risk assessment in compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule. Literature related 
to cyber risk management in healthcare is reviewed along with literature related to tools 
which enhance or automate cyber risk management processes. 
Background Related to the Problem 
 Risk assessments are an important method of validating the current state of a 
cyber security program. Given that cyber security is regarded as an enterprise risk 
management function, risk assessments encapsulate all components of an 
organization’s security posture. Within the healthcare industry, PHI is some of the most 
valuable data on the black market and the industry is highly regulated under HIPAA law. 
HIPAA compliance includes, but is not limited to, the HIPAA Security Rule, HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and HIPAA Enforcement Rule. Under the HIPAA Security Rule (HHS, 
2003), healthcare entities are required to conduct periodic cyber security risk 
assessments which focus on the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards 
deployed within the enterprise. The HIPAA Privacy Rule relates to privacy regulations 
and the HIPAA Enforcement Rule relates to the enforcement of HIPAA provisions. Over 
the past several years, HHS has levied significant fines against healthcare providers 




Figure 1. The Cost of HIPAA Non-Compliance. (HIPAA Journal, 2015) 
As Figure 1 shows, violations can result in fines as high as $1.5 million. Each PHI 
record in a data breach is considered a violation, so this can add up very quickly for 
organizations with many records exposed. Figures 2 and 3 show the most recent 
breach data for 2016. In several cases, the fine exceeded $1.5 million which typically 
involved multiple breaches or a long history of noncompliance. The largest HIPAA fine 
to date was levied against Advocate Health Network for just over $5.5 million in August 









Figure 3. Summary of 2016 HIPAA Settlements (Part 2). (HIPAA Journal, 2017) 
 Much of the attention with respect to cyber security in healthcare has gone to the 
mid-sized and large providers. These entities typically have more financial and human 
resources to devote to implementing security measures. With the overwhelming 
responsibilities that small businesses face in trying to meet the needs of the business, 
this work aims to address this well-known gap and demystify the cyber risk 
management process. The review of literature will consider various efforts undertaken 




Literature Related to the Problem 
The federal government offers a few key resources to assist any small healthcare 
clinic with cyber risk management and HIPAA compliance. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2014) is the current 
broad industry standard used in both the public and private sectors. NIST also released 
a framework specifically geared for small businesses, including small healthcare clinics. 
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016) The Balridge Cybersecurity Excellence Builder (NIST, 2016) is a 
self-assessment tool provided by NIST which improves the ability of organizations to 
understand their cyber risk posture and take appropriate action. HHS provides 
information specific to HIPAA compliance, including the HIPAA Security Rule. (HHS, 
n.d.) 
 According to Morrissey (2017), "The demands of implementing an effective 
security risk assessment are the most difficult for smaller urban or rural practices, which 
typically have tight margins" (p. 39). Green, et al. (2015) specifically looked at managing 
PHI for low monetary resource healthcare providers. They found that these entities are 
critically lacking in in their ability to maintain a sound cyber risk posture and mentioned 
that, for many of these providers, “ongoing support will be needed…to remain viable” (p. 
17). Blanke & McGrady (2016) created a detailed list of recommendations for security 
risk assessments based on the most recent data for healthcare data breaches. These 
recommendations can be foundational for small providers to move forward with their 
security programs. 
Recent cyber risk management case studies have been administered in Canada 
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(Desouza & Valverde, 2016), Turkey (Namoʇlu & Ülgen, 2014), and Iran (Zarei & 
Sadoughi, 2016). Each of these cases involved medium or large healthcare 
organizations, which further suggests this to be an area of need for small healthcare 
providers in the United States. Lisbon & Rice (2017) used the SRA tool to assess a 
small dental clinic which utilized a cloud service provider. The methodology and data set 
from that work are core components of this expanded work. 
 Security education and awareness training is a key component of a healthcare 
security program. Fernandez-Aleman, et al. (2015) found a lack of security education 
and awareness training as well as communication of security expectations led to 
security lapses in healthcare organizations. He & Johnson (2015) examined how to 
better implement the lessons learned from security incidents compared with the typical 
healthcare organization. Bai, et al. (2014) offered a decision-making methodology to 
improve workflow processes and efficiencies related to cyber risk, attempting to tackle 
the low-resource problem on the process level in healthcare. Wei, Lin & Loho-Noya 
(2013) created a quantitative security risk assessment method with an emphasis on 
managing the risk of PHI. 
Enterprise cyber security issues were previously relegated to the IT domain and 
budget. Andre (2017) makes clear that this outdated approach is untenable and 
requires a strategic risk management-based approach to address the distinct 
challenges in healthcare. Cascardo (2016) details numerous risk analysis and risk 
management steps that healthcare organizations can take to meet compliance 
obligations and reduce the likelihood of data breaches. Similar prescriptions are offered 
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by Blass & Miller (2015), with specific recommendations for the creation and 
maintenance of documentation, regular risk assessments, and appropriate training. 
 An important healthcare consideration is the inherent conflict of interest between 
protecting the patient and protecting their data. In certain crisis situations, protecting the 
patient may supersede protecting their data ethically and under the law. Kisekka (2016) 
explored this topic in depth by examining the resilience of healthcare IT personnel in 
their response to extreme healthcare events. She found that a well-prepared 
organization is more likely to protect the patient in these situations while also 
safeguarding their PHI, instead of having to make this compromise. This work should 
give confidence to healthcare providers that a proactive approach to cyber security will 
reap many benefits. 
 Continuous improvement is critical to building a resilient cyber security program. 
The emerging industry standard is maturity, which measures the strength of a security 
program at the business process level rather than simply checking the box for audit 
compliance. (Veltsos, 2016) Other recent work (Molnar & Großmann, 2017) proposed a 
maturity model which encapsulates four angles: tool support, risk assessment, testing, 
and compliance. Security programs would receive a maturity rating of level 1-5 in each 
of these areas, with 1 indicating little to no development and 5 indicating a significant 
level of business processes in place. This type of approach paints a more complete 
picture of the actual capabilities and processes of an organization’s program and 
ensures that the leadership of the organization is continuously focused on the next level 
of maturity that it aims to reach. For small clinics, this may involve just one or two 
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individuals and can help to better understand the context of their responsibilities. 
 Contracts are an emerging cyber security priority, particularly with respect to 
third-party vendors. Small organizations may have dozens of vendor relationships, while 
large organizations likely have thousands. Travis & Schwartz (2017) indicate several 
key areas to include in vendor contracts, including a notice and cooperation clause, a 
cyber security practices clause, and a cyber liability insurance or indemnification clause. 
Particularly if there is no insurance, they indicate indemnification clauses should be 
placed separately since the cost of a data breach far exceeds standard indemnification 
ceilings. Tschider (2016) recommends using standard language and strong contractual 
terms when negotiating cyber security contracts with cloud service providers. Business 
Associate Agreements (BAAs) are needed specifically for vendors that deal with PHI 
directly. (Healthcare Risk Management, 2017) 
Literature Related to the Methodology 
 The SRA tool (ONC, 2016) is owned by HHS and was collaboratively developed 
by three of its sub-entities: The Office of the National Coordinator (ONC), Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) and Office of the General Counsel (OGC). According to HIMSS (2016), 
the most recently updated version of the SRA tool streamlines the ability of small 
healthcare providers to comply with the HIPAA Security Rule. In its literature, the ONC 
makes clear that small healthcare providers are required to conduct HIPAA security risk 




Other tools exist in private industry which can supplement the SRA tool 
functionality. The Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) offers a free information 
sharing tool, Cyber Threat XChange (CTX), which offers automated threat management 
for organizations of all sizes. (HITRUST, 2017) This gives healthcare organizations the 
ability to strengthen their cyber risk posture irrespective of their maturity level. 
Organizations can also use a free tool to benchmark third-party vendor cyber risks. 
(CyberGRX, 2017) These results can then be fed into the SRA tool, which may be 
useful given the complexity of managing third-party cyber risks. 
Summary 
 As the data in this chapter revealed, healthcare providers have a strong incentive 
to conduct risk assessments for the purposes of HIPAA compliance. Solutions for small 
healthcare entities have generally been overlooked in the body of knowledge. This 
allowed for the opportunity to conduct HIPAA security risk assessments using the SRA 











Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
 A qualitative risk assessment using the SRA tool was used. Information was 
gathered in a detailed manner and methodically analyzed with respect to the HIPAA 
Security Rule requirements 
.Design of the Research 
 The research was conducted in a qualitative manner. While there were data 
points to reference in the SRA tool, such as risk level and likelihood, these factors were 
subjectively combined to determine whether the risk level is acceptable or must be 
mitigated. The HHS website and its guidance within the tool helped to define terms and 
provide context for what was needed. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected by interviewing the owner of each clinic to obtain detailed 
answers to each of the questions within the SRA tool. (ONC, 2016) An experienced 
security auditor was consulted early in the process to help guide it and ensure its 
accuracy with current industry trends. Data was entered directly into the tool which later 
produced a spreadsheet-based report with the fields of each question. Notes were also 
taken and later consolidated to form the overall picture which will be described in the 
Data Presentation & Analysis chapter.  
Approximately 4-6 hours were spent with the owner of each clinic for the 
assessment; the first assessment took significantly longer due to it being the first time 
using the tool. The assessment included doing a physical walk-through of each site and 
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asking follow-up questions about its configuration. With practice, the entire process of 
gathering detailed, relevant data should take maybe 1-2 hours. Analyzing, integrating, 
and presenting the data should take additional time for the assessor. 
Data Analysis 
The SRA tool consisted of 156 detailed questions and was run as an executable 
file, which locally stored the data entries within the assessment data file. The context of 
each question was geared towards protecting PHI through administrative policies, 
physical access restrictions, or technical safeguards specific to the requirements laid 
out in the HIPAA Security Rule. Appendix A contains the full list of SRA tool questions 
for each of these areas. 
The three types of questions were standard, required, and addressable. All 
entities must comply with the standard and required questions. Addressable questions 
would require an explanation for noncompliance along with documented alternative 
measures, if appropriate. (ONC, 2016) 
For each question, there were fields to detail current efforts, suggest appropriate 
remediation steps, and mark the risk likelihood and impact. Questions could be flagged 
for further review at a later time, there was a section for additional notes, and there was 
a guidance area in the right pane to assist with answering the question. Figure 4 





Figure 4. SRA Tool Question Sample 
The questions were quite redundant throughout the assessment; it was 
determined that, out of 156 questions, roughly 100 needed to be answered for the small 
clinics in these cases. Small entities with one IT staff member, who may be the owner, 
do not require the granularity of all 156 questions. Each question was qualitatively 
addressed and compiled within the administrative, technical, and physical control 






 The SRA tool was adapted to fit the needs of these two cases. Overall, it served 






















Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 Information was gathered from the two clinics using the SRA tool. Once 
collected, the information was synthesized and consolidated into a coherent set of data 
which is presented in this chapter. This chapter also features an analysis of the security 
gaps uncovered by each assessment as well as a comparative analysis between using 
the cloud to safeguard PHI vs. housing PHI on-premises. 
Data Presentation 
 As data was entered into the SRA tool during each assessment, it saved the 
answers and later presented them as a spreadsheet report as shown in Figure 5 (use 2-
2.5x zoom): 
 
Figure 5. SRA Tool Spreadsheet Report 
 To protect anonymity and preserve space, only samples of the actual data in the 
SRA tool report are presented in this example. The full data sets will be revealed in this 
section. Clinic A was initially assessed by Lisbon & Rice (2017); its data presentation is 
paraphrased in the subsequent sub-section. 
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It should be noted that Clinic A demonstrated a significantly more mature risk 
posture than Clinic B. For this reason, the presentation of the data for each clinic varies. 
Clinic A features more granular detail that correlates more closely to the specific 
questions of the SRA tool while Clinic B gives a clear picture with some specificity of its 
relevant cyber security activities. The data analysis will more closely analyze the gaps 
within Clinic B which reveal its lack of maturity. The concept of maturity in cyber security 
will be analyzed further in the Discussion chapter. 
Case Study: Clinic A. Clinic A employed five people and used eight stationary 
computing devices. It was responsible for roughly 1,600 patient PHI records. The owner 
remotely managed the computing environment as needed using a virtual private 
network (VPN) from home; they had no dedicated IT personnel, so the owner took on all 
IT and security-related responsibilities. Clinic A used a CSP to safeguard PHI, which 
effectively transferred a large portion of risk to the CSP for managing it. The clinic owner 
reported that the cloud architecture itself was HIPAA-compliant, as was the BAA 
between the entities. It was found that the owner of Clinic A was quite organized with 
respect to many of the responsibilities outlined in the SRA tool, which will now be 
detailed according to what the owner reported during the assessment. 
Clinic A took many actions in the area of administrative controls. The clinic 
clearly stated the name of its security point-of-contact in its BAAs related to accessing 
PHI and handled PHI in a similar manner to financial records such that a reasonable 
level of security of PHI was maintained. A list of all BAAs was maintained, and they had 
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an attorney review and sign off on the language of all BAAs. The BAA between the 
clinic and CSP included termination procedures as well as the handling of PHI.  
With regards to employee hiring procedures, Clinic A would only hire dental-
certified individuals after performing a thorough criminal background check. When an 
employee was terminated, they would promptly disable the user’s logon access and 
delete the employee’s physical access codes to the building. Their employee handbook 
served as a guideline for job descriptions in the practice. The handbook included 
language which explicitly forbade violation of the office PHI policy, which would result in 
employee termination. Employees also performed cleaning duties. 
Clinic A performed segregation of duties with its PHI processes, where possible, 
including with the processing of cash payments. The clinic owner implemented various 
levels of access control within the local computing environment as well as the CSP 
environment with an emphasis on implementing role-based access and least privilege. 
The owner had full administrative access while the office manager had access to most 
administrative functions, except for adding and removing users. Other clinical personnel 
had strictly role-based access for their jobs, including clinical notes and health histories 
but no other PHI. It is notable that there existed billing codes within the CSP database 
that abstracted unnecessary PHI details based on access level, which effectively 
accounted for an additional layer of access control in the day-to-day functioning of the 
business.  
The owner proactively managed both environments in consultation with the CSP 
to maximize functionality while ensuring there were appropriate access controls on all 
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electronic devices to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of PHI. Within the clinic 
environment, this included system reviews, multiple firewalls, operating system updates 
to all devices, and regular password resets. 
Many of the HIPAA Security Rule requirements for technical controls were 
implemented within the CSP interface. The CSP interface encrypted PHI data at rest 
and in transit. It had an auto-logoff policy for idle users, which paired with the clinic’s 
auto-logoff policy of 4-6 hours to meet this requirement.  The owner followed the CSP’s 
recommendations for security settings within the CSP interface and paired these with 
practical technical controls in the local environment. The CSP performed regular data 
backups and maintained an extremely high availability of the service. This meant a 
service outage was unlikely and the clinic owner determined this was an acceptable 
business risk. Clinic A did not use shared accounts for any business function and 
maintained a secure list of authorized users and passwords. 
Overall, Clinic A effectively complied with physical security requirements. They 
used an internal security system which included motion alarms and locks. The system 
was periodically tested to confirm it was in working order. A third-party security firm 
managed the protection of the facilities and equipment; the clinic had a BAA with this 
entity. Clinic employees had free access to the facility during employment. If a breach 
occurred after hours when the doors were locked, a security team would be promptly 
dispatched in response. 
The owner proactively maintained a Facility User Access List which included 
active employees as well as accountants who had 1099 form access, but no facility 
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access. The facility itself was designed to avoid scenarios where a casual passerby 
could view PHI on clinic devices and the front desk computer was always monitored by 
staff personnel. Clinic A also maintained an inventory of devices containing PHI and 
ensured that any physical security measures implemented occurred with minimal impact 
to the business. 
Case Study: Clinic B. Clinic B employed 12 people and used 15 stationary 
devices. It was responsible for protecting roughly 10,000 PHI records. These records 
were housed on a desktop device running Windows 7 through the Patterson EagleSoft 
user interface. Although the device ran a desktop version of Windows, it is otherwise 
referenced as a server in this work since it provided PHI services for the clinic. The 
clinic owner was the only individual with logon access to the device and managed it by 
remotely connecting to it over a VPN as needed. A previous IT contractor set up the 
entire system which served as a single point of failure for the entire clinic. The clinic 
owner estimated a daily loss of $8,000 per day if the device stopped working. The 
owner was unaware of how the device was set up and has consulted EagleSoft, as 
needed, to keep it running. The owner ran two sets of regular data backups from the 
device: one went to a cloud backup provider and the other to an external hard drive 
stored in the office. Clinic personnel were able to send secure HIPAA-compliant email 
containing PHI out of the EagleSoft interface using a specific version of Microsoft Office. 
Clinic devices had web browsers installed with free internet access. 
Clinic B had an employee handbook, employee termination policies, and BAAs 
with some, but not all, of its key vendors. They implemented segregation of duties 
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through receipt of cash payments. Employees were granted role-based access within 
EagleSoft to only what they needed for their job and clinic devices were managed by 
the owner with least privilege in mind. A couple of examples of this were that most clinic 
devices did not have rights to print and employee system access was terminated before 
they received official termination notice. The clinic owner periodically reviewed and 
scanned the devices for vulnerabilities to see if there was anything obvious to eliminate 
from them. The clinic did not use shared accounts and auto-logoff policies existed both 
within the EagleSoft interface as well as on each clinic device. This ensured that free 
access to PHI did not exist if a device was left unmonitored.  
The clinic contracted with a security company to respond to security alarms after 
hours. Its internal security system featuring motion alarms and locks had been tested. 
The facility allowed free access which included the use of open bays. These bays 
allowed for limited viewing of PHI on a nearby device if another patient was in the area. 
Other clinic devices were not out in the open or clearly visible to patients walking by. 
The clinic did not use mobile devices. 
Data Analysis 
 Based on the answers from the assessment and current cyber security 
knowledge, various gaps were identified and are qualitatively analyzed further in the 
Gaps Analysis sub-section. The Comparative Analysis sub-section examines some of 
the critical factors for each clinic to consider as well as the pros and cons of a cloud-
based approach to protecting PHI. Similar to the previous section, the gaps analysis 
involving Clinic A is paraphrased. (Lisbon & Rice, 2017) 
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Gaps Analysis. During the assessments, various gaps in the security posture of 
both clinics emerged. Most prominently was the lack of documentation in numerous 
areas where the respective owners attested compliance as well as numerous other 
areas of noncompliance.  
Documentation is a critical area that HHS demands for HIPAA compliance. If a 
security incident occurs and there is no documentation to validate an existing process, 
HHS will regard the entity to be noncompliant. For both clinics, nearly 40% of the 
questions answered within the SRA tool indicated documentation shortcomings. Both 
clinic owners performed most of the cyber security processes on an ad hoc basis 
without proper documentation. The creation and maintenance of documentation is 
needed in the three HIPAA Security Rule areas of administrative, technical, and 
physical controls. The following paragraphs spell out an exhaustive list of 
documentation needs for both healthcare entities. 
With regards to administrative documentation, both clinic owners must formally 
document a security plan and the results from this risk assessment. They should 
formally document a program to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to PHI that were 
mentioned in this risk assessment and classify the risks as high, moderate, or low. Each 
clinic owner should document their full list of duties as the security point-of-contact.  
Each clinic needs to create policies and procedures to assess and manage risk 
to PHI. In these policies, each practice must describe how its risk management program 
prevents PHI exposure. Both clinics will need a written policy which explains how they 
grant role-based access to clinical personnel and business associates. There must be a 
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policy to explicitly grant access to PHI to those who need it and deny access to others. 
Within the employee handbook, they should ensure it uses formal termination language, 
review the termination language for misusing PHI, and include an Acceptable Use 
section with language about devices being monitored and tracked. Both clinics should 
create security training documentation that includes sanction policies, how malware can 
get into systems, and good practices to follow to protect PHI. 
Both clinics need to put together a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) and 
Contingency Plan (CP) for emergency situations that may arise. The CP should include 
how PHI will be handled should a local server or CSP failure occur. Each owner should 
evaluate when it would be practical to test the CP and document these tests. This 
includes identifying and assessing the criticality of information systems applications and 
how PHI would be accessed and stored during the implementation of the CP. 
Each clinic should perform several administrative tasks on at least an annual 
basis. Periodic employee training regarding information security threats to PHI and 
periodic review of risk assessment policies and procedures should occur. BAA contract 
language should be reviewed to affirm HIPAA compliance, the CP should be tested, and 
the employee handbook should be updated as appropriate. 
Technical documentation needs to be created by both clinics. They must 
document their identity verification procedures for an individual who seeks access to 
PHI as well as their definition of emergencies that are the most likely and have the 
greatest business impact. These emergency scenarios will drive the DRP and CP 
documents. Both clinics must also maintain an inventory and location record of all 
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workstation devices; document employee facility and workstation access; and document 
the regular review and update of physical security and environmental vulnerabilities.  
Physical documentation must include each owner’s use of remote access to the 
facility computing environment, how the positioning of workstations limits unauthorized 
viewing of PHI, and security procedures for the secure storage and destruction of PHI 
data. It must also include procedures for the protection of keys, combinations, and other 
physical access controls. Any modifications or repairs to physical security features must 
also be documented. 
Multiple technical gaps exist within each clinic and will now be addressed in 
further detail. Both clinics should implement a USB restriction policy on clinic devices. 
Given that individuals have free facility access during business hours, such a policy 
should be carefully considered along with its business impact on the appropriate 
devices. To avoid internet-based threats, both clinics should consider implementing IP 
whitelisting on clinic machines to avoid web application-based attacks from Internet 
surfing. Group Policy implementation, web filtering, or virtual machine deployment could 
also accomplish or supplement efforts towards this goal. Another option is to look at 
setting up virtual local area networks (VLANs) on the local clinic network where each 
device would be segregated. This would deter an internet-based intrusion on one device 
from affecting other devices. 
 Given that both clinics use network print-fax devices which commonly receive 
faxed PHI over plain old telephone service (POTS), each print-fax device is vulnerable 
to physical memory intrusions and internet-based intrusions. Cable locks on these 
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devices can help prevent this memory from being stolen and VLANs can segment these 
devices to prevent a compromise should an attacker gain control of another internet-
connected office device. 
Gaps: Clinic A. The most obvious gap for Clinic A was its use of single-factor 
authentication over the internet when connecting to the CSP to access PHI records. 
Most responsible healthcare providers have already moved to multifactor authentication, 
and Clinic A should initiate conversations with the CSP to make this happen. Passwords 
are considered weak security over the internet, and this action would likely decrease the 
liability for the clinic should a breach occur. 
 Clinic A also had a process gap when it received emails containing PHI. In these 
situations, they should take special measures to record the information while not 
retransmitting it over the internet. Replies to emails contain metadata which could allow 
an unauthorized third party to reconstruct PHI data that was deleted from the message. 
The clinic should implement a policy where users must not reply directly to any received 
emails containing PHI. Clinic personnel should create a new email message with no PHI 
in it to send and ensure that all outgoing messages have a legal disclaimer at the 
bottom of the email that absolves the clinic of liability for any PHI received. The clinic 
should also implement an email retention policy based on the knowledge that client PHI 
may exist in a mailbox folder and should be deleted within a set timeframe. 
 Clinic A must conduct due diligence to understand and document how the CSP is 
handling PHI. While these risks were transferred to the CSP for its day-to-day 
management, it is still the responsibility of the clinic to ensure the CSP is compliant with 
33 
 
HIPAA requirements on a periodic basis. They should verify the existence of any 
security certification the CSP holds i.e. a service organization controls (SOC) standard. 
Such certifications clearly communicate the standards of compliance that exist in the 
CSP environment. They should also check with the CSP regarding specific security 
measures that are in place, including encryption procedures, backup procedures, and 
which business associates have access to PHI. Encryption includes data at rest and in 
transit. Each of these answers should be documented and periodically re-checked by 
the clinic during annual reviews or risk assessments. 
Gaps: Clinic B. There were many gaps within Clinic B that were of a more 
serious nature than the ones identified within Clinic A. Clinic B lacked a competent 
management approach which protected the security of PHI. The lone server which ran 
EagleSoft was a low-maintenance option to keep the business running, but it was a 
single point of failure that would be costly for the business when it inevitably fails. Its 
location at the front of the office under the desk was in too open of an area. Additionally, 
the external hard drive used to back up PHI was located on the front desk near the 
server for convenience. Securing the external hard drive and moving the server to a 
more secure location are critical steps that need to occur in short order. 
Encrypting data at rest was another critical gap in Clinic B. While EagleSoft had 
an encryption feature in its current version for data stored on the server, this was not 
manually implemented by the owner. EagleSoft encrypts its communications between 
its client program and server calls over the internet. PHI data backed up to the cloud 
and the external hard drive were not encrypted at rest. The owner used a VPN to 
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transfer the data, which implies it was encrypted in transit. The owner originally used 
two backup sources because of the perceived unreliability of the cloud when first 
deploying the solution several years ago. The cloud backup provider was not HIPAA-
compliant, so they need to either choose an appropriate HIPAA-compliant solution with 
that provider or find a new provider. The owner stayed with this backup provider 
because it was a free solution. Off-site backups had not been tested and the owner did 
not have a process in place for maintaining PHI based on HIPAA requirements. 
The BAAs with EagleSoft, the cloud backup provider, and other vendors with PHI 
access need to be reviewed, and in certain cases remediated, to comply with HIPAA 
requirements. A contingency plan and disaster recovery plan need to be created which 
address the single point of failure gap for the server containing PHI.  
Another gap was logon monitoring. Clinic B did not monitor logons on its devices 
and the owner did not know to what extent EagleSoft monitored the logons within its 
interface. This is an area to follow up and document accordingly with the vendor. 
The remediation of each of these gaps needs to be documented clearly so that 
the next iteration of risk assessment for Clinic B can focus more granularly on other 
core items within the SRA tool. 
Comparative Analysis: Cloud vs. On-Premises. By operating in a Software-
as-a-Service (SaaS) model, Clinic A transferred the risks of managing PHI encryption, 
backups, and server redundancy to the CSP. Should a healthcare provider have an 
interest in managing their own HIPAA-compliant on-premises IT environment, there are 
several focal points to consider. The advantages of an on-premises setup may include 
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greater autonomy, lower costs, and a lack of reliance on the internet to do business. 
Rural areas without high-speed internet may benefit less from the cloud services model. 
More time will be required to manage an on-premises environment due to the added 
complexity; this could also be transferred to an IT contractor or managed services 
provider, which would add to the cost. 
 The advantages of using the cloud option are greater simplicity and less 
overhead for the small business. Particularly for non-tech-savvy small business owners, 
this may be the ideal option. In spite of these benefits, businesses still must conduct 
due diligence on the CSP for HIPAA compliance, manage the local IT environment 
effectively, and understand that their business depends on a reliable internet 
connection. Poor security practices will negate many of the benefits that the cloud 
provides and potentially result in HIPAA fines. 
 An additional option to consider is a hybrid cloud deployment, using Clinic B as 
an example. In one scenario, Clinic B continues to run its primary systems in a modified 
HIPAA-compliant setup that uses the cloud for failover purposes. The second scenario 
uses the cloud for primary business functionality and Clinic B maintains its current 
infrastructure while making appropriate improvements in the event of a cloud or internet 
failure. The latter might be the most cost-effective option with the costs of operating in a 
HIPAA-compliant cloud being fairly reasonable. One of the key considerations to this 
equation is that the clinic owner has a reasonable base of IT knowledge which can be 
leveraged in a hybrid solution to improve business margins, should there ever be an 
internet or cloud outage. This is an important distinction compared with someone who 
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has little knowledge or interest in IT and outsources the IT-related tasks to a contractor. 
Another way to frame this is that it is a time vs. money trade-off, with a central question 
being to what degree a business has an interest in investing time in its IT infrastructure. 
Summary 
 This chapter extensively covered the data collected from each case study, 
analyzed the security gaps within each clinic, and offered a comparative analysis of IT 


















Chapter V: Discussion, Future Work, and Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter includes a discussion of recent cyberattack data involving small 
businesses, the evolving regulatory landscape, contract caveats, and a further analysis 
of maturity in the HIPAA context. Numerous areas are identified where future work can 
build upon the current body of knowledge. It concludes with a summary of the 
contributions of this work and a final comment on the use of the cloud vs. on-premises 
solutions. 
Discussion 
Recent data suggests that only one in four small businesses are well-prepared 
for a cyberattack (William, 2017) and that 43% of attacks targeted small businesses in 
2015, up 25% from 2011. (Sophy, 2016) Furthermore, 60% of small businesses that 
suffer cyberattacks go out of business within six months. (Miller, 2016) This suggests 
that currently there is significant opportunity to assist small businesses with improving 
their security posture and mitigating risks. While these numbers may not be precisely 
mirrored in the healthcare sector, it is not far-fetched to think that many small healthcare 
organizations would be crippled by a targeted attack and generally need greater 
attention placed on their security program. 
From a regulatory perspective, the financial incentives continue to shift towards 
compliance. Growing HIPAA fines, usually after breaches, continue to receive 
widespread attention. Morrissey (2017) noted that the Medicare Access and Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 added an additional layer of 
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financial incentives for healthcare providers to prioritize security. Providers who are 
audited and cannot show documentation of security risk assessments now face a 
resultant 25% reduction in Medicare reimbursements; if providers are found to have lied 
about compliance, they are liable to incur at least a five-figure fine. A 25% Medicare 
reimbursement reduction is a significant incentive for providers who are heavily reliant 
on these payments. If this requirement continues to be enforced on a broader scale, it 
may create a larger shift in the approaches of healthcare organizations towards more 
resilient cyber security practices. 
Contract liability is an additional point of emphasis for both clinics. HIPAA-
compliant BAAs need to be put in place with new or existing vendors that deal directly 
with PHI, and periodic audits of BAAs are needed. Healthcare Risk Management (2017) 
advised that using BAAs for vendors that do not deal with PHI introduces ambiguity with 
regards to HIPAA regulations. They indicate that it is worth spending time and possibly 
consulting with an attorney to ensure appropriate BAAs include provisions which are 
reasonable or favorable. Note that an industry standard that is universally amenable for 
both parties has yet to emerge. This implies that third-party risk could be a business 
backbreaker and needs to be given high priority within the security plan. 
The maturity of a security program is important to consider when determining 
how to interpret the results of a risk assessment, with the understanding that risk 
assessments are an iterative process. It may not be realistic for a small clinic to make a 
significant jump in its security posture after the first assessment. The signals from HHS 
are that it wants to see commitment and progress in this realm. If a healthcare provider 
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can demonstrate that it has taken definitive steps forward with its security program, this 
can help to avoid or reduce fines that would result from a breach or random audit. Clinic 
B is on a very basic level of maturity and would need to approach its next iteration quite 
differently than Clinic A, which is perhaps a level or two higher on the 1-5 maturity scale 
(Veltsos, 2016). 
Future Work 
There are many areas where future work can occur. A closer evaluation of the 
factors from a security standpoint that distinguish small from medium-sized practices 
would help streamline the learning curve for healthcare providers and empower small 
providers to maintain a growth mindset with respect to these compliance obligations. An 
important component to note about this work is that the SRA tool is geared specifically 
for HIPAA Security Rule compliance, which is a subset of HIPAA compliance. Future 
work could integrate this risk assessment process within the HIPAA Security Rule with 
other HIPAA compliance requirements i.e. the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Many of these 
requirements are less complex than what has been undertaken in this work, yet a 
holistic overall solution would be most beneficial and practical for healthcare providers 
to further streamline their compliance processes. 
Exploring the knowledge and priority gaps between small healthcare providers 
could also provide valuable insight into the thinking behind what exists in practice. A 
well-formulated query of providers could further elicit their needs without causing undue 
risk about sharing what is likely a weak cyber risk posture in many cases. 
Another angle for future consideration is how to improve the experience of using 
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the SRA tool. The SRA tool is essentially a spreadsheet that does nothing to intelligently 
automate the output. Integrating the SRA tool with an orchestration technology would 
give the data more value in an automated workflow. Alternately, the SRA tool could 
integrate with machine learning technology to take the input from a healthcare provider 
directly and return output which is relevant and actionable for the business. 
The HITRUST CTX partnership with Trend Micro is an important opportunity for 
healthcare providers to improve the maturity of their threat intelligence capabilities. 
(HITRUST, 2017) This information sharing opportunity is free to join and future work 
could deploy this functionality in a small clinical setting to demonstrate the value of the 
evolving information sharing capabilities for small healthcare providers as a 
complementary component of a resilient security program. 
Contract liability seems to be an area of great opportunities and challenges. 
Future work could emphasize a deep dive into the dynamics of all perspectives involved 
in the third-party contractor risk problem and offer targeted analysis which can drive 
forward a solution that works for all parties. Such work would give small healthcare 
providers greater clarity and confidence to negotiate BAAs that maintain the resilience 
of their cyber risk posture. 
Conclusion 
While not a one-size-fits-all solution, the SRA tool effectively provided an 
overarching context to conduct HIPAA security risk assessments. The data from both 
case studies reveals the depth and breadth of knowledge required to effectively assess 
the cyber risk posture of these organizations. Risk assessments are a serious 
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undertaking and require a full commitment from the organization to meet HIPAA 
requirements. Even small healthcare providers are required to safeguard the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI data. Regardless of who contracts with 
them as a service provider, these organizations own the requirements for HIPAA 
compliance. Therefore, it is critical that appropriate documentation and BAAs be in 
place to protect from this growing avenue of risk. Common sense cyber security 
measures must be followed for other efforts, such as safeguarding PHI using a CSP, to 
succeed. 
Clinic A showed a higher level of maturity than Clinic B by reporting answers that 
had a high degree of compliance. However, both clinics must add significant 
documentation to demonstrate compliance in many areas identified by the SRA tool 
questionnaire. Clinic B had several critical areas to remediate in short order, or else it 
risks getting caught flat-footed when a breach or other disaster occurs. 
The data also provided a window into the two approaches used by these clinics: 
housing PHI in the cloud vs. on-premises. The cloud is an ideal solution in many ways, 
and it is cost-effective for businesses that have access to high-speed internet. An on-
premises solution is preferable for entities who prefer a more hands-on approach, or 
perhaps do not want their business to rely on an internet connection. A hybrid cloud 
option may be preferable in many cases, which can offer the best of both worlds with a 
modest level of time investment from the business. This ultimately makes whether, and 
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Appendix: SRA Tool Questions 
Administrative Safeguards 
 A1 - §164.308(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice develop, document, and 
implement policies and procedures for assessing and managing risk to its 
electronic protected health information (ePHI)? 
 A2 - §164.308(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice have a process for 
periodically reviewing its risk analysis policies and procedures and making 
updates as necessary? 
 A3 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice categorize its 
information systems based on the potential impact to your practice should they 
become unavailable?   
 A4 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice periodically complete an 
accurate and thorough risk analysis, such as upon occurrence of a significant 
event or change in your business organization or environment?  
 A5 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice have a formal 
documented program to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities to ePHI identified 
through the risk analysis? 
 A6 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice assure that its risk 
management program prevents against the impermissible use and disclosure of 
ePHI? 
 A7 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice document the results of 
its risk analysis and assure the results are distributed to appropriate members of 
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the workforce who are responsible for mitigating the threats and vulnerabilities to 
ePHI identified through the risk analysis? 
 A8 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice formally document a 
security plan? 
 A9 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice have a formal and 
documented process or regular human resources policy to discipline workforce 
members who have access to your organization’s ePHI if they are found to have 
violated the office’s policies to prevent system misuse, abuse, and any harmful 
activities that involve your practice's ePHI? 
 A10 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice include its sanction 
policies and procedures as part of its security awareness and training program 
for all workforce members? 
 A11 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for the review of information system activity? 
 A12 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Required Does your practice regularly review 
information system activity?  
 A13 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice have a senior-level person 
whose job it is to develop and implement security policies and procedures or act 
as a security point of contact? 
 A14 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Is your practice’s security point of contact 
qualified to assess its security protections as well as serve as the point of contact 
for security policies, procedures, monitoring, and training? 
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 A15 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice have a job description for its 
security point of contact that includes that person's duties, authority, and 
accountability? 
 A16 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice make sure that its workforce 
members and others with authorized access to your ePHI know the name and 
contact information for its security point of contact and know to contact this 
person if there are any security problems? 
 A17 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice have a list that includes all 
members of its workforce, the roles assigned to each, and the corresponding 
access that each role enables for your practice’s facilities, information systems, 
electronic devices, and ePHI? 
 A18 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice know all business 
associates and the access that each requires for your practice’s facilities, 
information systems, electronic devices, and ePHI? 
 A19 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice clearly define roles and 
responsibilities along logical lines and assures that no one person has too much 
authority for determining who can access your practice's facilities, information 
systems, and ePHI? 
 A20 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures that make sure those who need access to ePHI have access and 
those who do not are denied such access?   
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 A21 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Has your practice chosen someone whose job 
duty is to decide who can access ePHI (and under what conditions) and to create 
ePHI access rules that others can follow? 
 A22 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice define roles and job 
duties for all job functions and keep written job descriptions that clearly set forth 
the qualifications? 
 A23 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for access authorization that support segregation of duties?   
 A24 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice implement 
procedures for authorizing users and changing authorization permissions? 
 A25 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Do your practice’s policies and 
procedures for access authorization address the needs of those who are not 
members of its workforce? 
 A26 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your organization have policies 
and procedures that authorize members of your workforce to have access to 
ePHI and describe the types of access that are permitted?  
 A27 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B) Addressable Do your practice’s policies and 
procedures require screening workforce members prior to enabling access to its 
facilities, information systems, and ePHI to verify that users are trustworthy? 
 A28 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for terminating authorized access to its facilities, information systems, 
and ePHI once the need for access no longer exists? 
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 A29 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice have formal policies 
and policies and procedures to support when a workforce member’s employment 
is terminated and/or a relationship with a business associate is terminated?   
 A30 - §164.308(a)(4)(i) Standard Do your practice’s policies and procedures 
describe the methods it uses to limit access to its ePHI? 
 A31 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) Does your practice have policies and procedures that 
explain how it grants access to ePHI to its workforce members and to other 
entities (business associates)? 
 A32 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C) Addressable Do the roles and responsibilities 
assigned to your practice’s workforce members support and enforce segregation 
of duties?  
 A33 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice’s policies and 
procedures explain how your practice assigns user authorizations (privileges), 
including the access that are permitted?  
 A34 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice have a training program 
that makes each individual with access to ePHI aware of security measures to 
reduce the risk of improper access, uses, and disclosures? 
 A35 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice periodically review and 
update its security awareness and training program in response to changes in 
your organization, facilities or environment? 
 A36 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice provide ongoing basic 
security awareness to all workforce members, including physicians? 
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 A37 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice provide role-based training 
to all new workforce members? 
 A38 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice keep records that detail 
when each workforce member satisfactorily completed periodic training? 
 A39 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) Addressable As part of your practice’s ongoing 
security awareness activities, does your practice prepare and communicate 
periodic security reminders to communicate about new or important issues? 
 A40 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your practice’s awareness and 
training content include information about the importance of implementing 
software patches and updating antivirus software when requested?    
 A41 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your practice’s awareness and 
training content include information about how malware can get into your 
systems?  
 A42 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice include log-in 
monitoring as part of its awareness and training programs?   
 A43 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Addressable Does your practice include password 
management as part of its awareness and training programs? 
 A44 - §164.308(a)(6)(i) Standard Does your practice have policies and 
procedures designed to help prevent, detect and respond to security incidents?   
 A45 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice have incident response 




 A46 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice identify members of its 
incident response team and assure workforce members are trained and that 
incident response plans are tested? 
 A47 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice’s incident response plan 
align with its emergency operations and contingency plan, especially when it 
comes to prioritizing system recovery actions or events to restore key processes, 
systems, applications, electronic device and media, and information (such as 
ePHI)? 
 A48 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice implement the information 
system’s security protection tools to protect against malware?   
 A49 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice know what critical services 
and ePHI it must have available to support decision making about a patient’s 
treatment during an emergency?   
 A50 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice consider how natural or 
man-made disasters could damage its information systems or prevent access to 
ePHI and develop policies and procedures for responding to such a situation?  
 A51 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice regularly review/update its 
contingency plan as appropriate? 
 A52 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for the creation and secure storage of an electronic copy of ePHI that 
would be used in the case of system breakdown or disaster?  
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 A53 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for contingency plans to provide access to ePHI to continue 
operations after a natural or human-made disaster?   
 A54 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice have an emergency 
mode operations plan to ensure the continuation of critical business processes 
that must occur to protect the availability and security of ePHI immediately after a 
crisis situation?  
 A55 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for testing its contingency plans on a periodic basis? 
 A56 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E) Addressable Does your practice implement 
procedures for identifying and assessing the criticality of its information system 
applications and the storage of data containing ePHI that would be accessed 
through the implementation of its contingency plans? 
 A57 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice maintain and implement 
policies and procedures for assessing risk to ePHI and engaging in a periodic 
technical and non-technical evaluation in response to environmental or 
operational changes affecting the security of your practice’s ePHI? 
 A58 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice periodically monitor its 
physical environment, business operations, and information system to gauge the 
effectiveness of security safeguards?  
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 A59 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice identify the role responsible 
and accountable for assessing risk and engaging in ongoing evaluation, 
monitoring, and reporting? 
 A60 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice identify the role responsible 
and accountable for making sure that business associate agreements are in 
place before your practice enables a service provider to begin to create, access, 
store or transmit ePHI on your behalf? 
 A61 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice maintain a list of all of its 
service providers, indicating which have access to your practice’s facilities, 
information systems and ePHI? 
 A62 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and implement 
procedures to assure it obtains business associate agreements?    
 A63 - §164.308(b)(2) Required If your practice is the business associate of 
another covered entity and your practice has subcontractors performing activities 
to help carry out the activities that you have agreed to carry out for the other 
covered entity that involve ePHI, does your practice require these subcontractors 
to provide satisfactory assurances for the protection of the ePHI? 
 A64 - §164.308(b)(3) Required Does your practice execute business associate 
agreements when it has a contractor creating, transmitting or storing ePHI? 
 O1 - §164.314(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice assure that its business 
associate agreements include satisfactory assurances for safeguarding ePHI? 
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 O2 - §164.314(a)(2)(i) Required Do the terms and conditions of your practice’s 
business associate agreements state that the business associate will implement 
appropriate security safeguards to protect the privacy, confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of ePHI that it collects, creates, maintains, or transmits on behalf 
of the practice and timely report security incidents to your practice? 
 O3 - §164.314(a)(2)(iii) Required If your practice is the business associate of a 
covered entity do the terms and conditions of your practice’s business associate 
agreements state that your subcontractor (business associate) will implement 
appropriate security safeguards to protect the privacy, confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of ePHI that it collects, creates, maintains, or transmits on behalf 
of the covered entity? 
 PO1 -§164.316(a) Standard Do your practice’s processes enable the 
development and maintenance of policies and procedures that implement risk 
analysis, informed risk-based decision making for security risk mitigation, and 
effective mitigation and monitoring that protects the privacy, confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of ePHI? 
 PO2 - §164.316(b)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice assure that its policies and 
procedures are maintained in a manner consistent with other business records?  
 PO3 - §164.316(b)(1)(ii) Standard Does your practice assure that its other 




 PO4 - §164.316(b)(2)(i) Required Does your practice assure that its policies, 
procedures, and other security program documentation are retained for at least 
six (6) years from the date when it was created or last in effect, whichever is 
longer? 
 PO5 - §164.316(b)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice assure that its policies, 
procedures and other security program documentation are available to those who 
need it to perform the responsibilities associated with their role? 
 PO6 - §164.316(b)(2)(iii) Required Does your practice assure that it periodically 
reviews and updates (when needed) its policies, procedures, and other security 
program documentation? 
Technical Safeguards 
 T1 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
requiring safeguards to limit access to ePHI to those persons and software 
programs appropriate for their role? 
 T2 - § 164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
to grant access to ePHI based on the person or software programs appropriate 
for their role? 
 T3 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice analyze the activities 
performed by all of its workforce and service providers to identify the extent to 
which each needs access to ePHI? 
 T4 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice identify the security settings for 
each of its information systems and electronic devices that control access? 
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 T5 - §164.312(a)(2)(i) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for the assignment of a unique identifier for each authorized user? 
 T6 - §164.312(a)(2)(i) Required Does your practice require that each user enter 
a unique user identifier prior to obtaining access to ePHI? 
 T7 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures to enable access to ePHI in the event of an emergency? 
 T8 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice define what constitutes an 
emergency and identify the various types of emergencies that are likely to occur? 
 T9 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for creating an exact copy of ePHI as a backup? 
 T10 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice back up ePHI by saving an 
exact copy to a magnetic disk/tape or a virtual storage, such as a cloud 
environment? 
 T11 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have back up information 
systems so that it can access ePHI in the event of an emergency or when your 
practice’s primary systems become unavailable? 
 T12 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have the capability to 
activate emergency access to its information systems in the event of a disaster? 
 T13 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and 
procedures to identify the role of the individual accountable for activating 
emergency access settings when necessary? 
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 T14 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice designate a workforce 
member who can activate the emergency access settings for your information 
systems? 
 T15 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice test access when 
evaluating its ability to continue accessing ePHI and other health records during 
an emergency? 
 T16 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice effectively recover from an 
emergency and resume normal operations and access to ePHI? 
 T17 - §164.312(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures that require an authorized user’s session to be automatically logged-
off after a predetermined period of inactivity? 
 T18 - §164.312(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does a responsible person in your 
practice know the automatic logoff settings for its information systems and 
electronic devices? 
 T19 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Does your practice activate an automatic 
logoff that terminates an electronic session after a predetermined period of user 
inactivity? 
 T20 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for implementing mechanisms that can encrypt and decrypt ePHI? 
 T21 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice know the encryption 
capabilities of its information systems and electronic devices? 
60 
 
 T22 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice control access to ePHI 
and other health information by using encryption/decryption methods to deny 
access to unauthorized users? 
 T23 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
identifying hardware, software, or procedural mechanisms that record or examine 
information systems activities? 
 T24 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice identify its activities that create, 
store, and transmit ePHI and the information systems that support these 
business processes?  
 T25 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice categorize its activities and 
information systems that create, transmit or store ePHI as high, moderate or low 
risk based on its risk analyses? 
 T26 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice use the evaluation from its risk 
analysis to help determine the frequency and scope of its audits, when identifying 
the activities that will be tracked? 
 T27 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have audit control mechanisms 
that can monitor, record and/or examine information system activity? 
 T28 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
for creating, retaining, and distributing audit reports to appropriate workforce 
members for review? 
 T29 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice generate the audit reports and 
distribute them to the appropriate people for review? 
61 
 
 T30 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
establishing retention requirements for audit purposes? 
 T31 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice retain copies of its audit/access 
records? 
 T32 - §164.312(c)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
for protecting ePHI from unauthorized modification or destruction? 
 T33 - §164.312(c)(2) Addressable Does your practice have mechanisms to 
corroborate that ePHI has not been altered, modified or destroyed in an 
unauthorized manner? 
 T34 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice have policies and procedures 
for verification of a person or entity seeking access to ePHI is the one claimed? 
 T35 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice know the authentication 
capabilities of its information systems and electronic devices to assure that a 
uniquely identified user is the one claimed? 
 T36 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice use the evaluation from its risk 
analysis to select the appropriate authentication mechanism? 
 T37 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice protect the confidentiality of the 
documentation containing access control records (list of authorized users and 
passwords)? 
 T38 - §164.312(e)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 




 T39 - §164.312(e)(1) Standard Do your practice implement safeguards, to 
assure that ePHI is not accessed while en-route to its intended recipient?  
 T40 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice know what encryption 
capabilities are available to it for encrypting ePHI being transmitted from one 
point to another? 
 T41 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice take steps to reduce 
the risk that ePHI can be intercepted or modified when it is being sent 
electronically? 
 T42 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice implement encryption 
as the safeguard to assure that ePHI is not compromised when being transmitted 
from one point to another? 
 T44 - §164.312(e)(2)(ii) Addressable Does your practice have policies and 
procedures for encrypting ePHI when deemed reasonable and appropriate? 
 T45 - §164.312(e)(2)(ii) Addressable When analyzing risk, does your practice 
consider the value of encryption for assuring the integrity of ePHI is not accessed 
or modified when it is stored or transmitted? 
Physical Safeguards 
 PH1 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have an inventory of the physical 




 PH2 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have policies and procedures for the 
physical protection of your facilities and equipment? This includes controlling the 
environment inside the facility.  
 PH3 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have policies and procedures for the 
physical protection of your facilities and equipment? This includes controlling the 
environment inside the facility.  
 PH4 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have physical protections in place to 
manage physical security risks, such as a) locks on doors and windows and b) 
cameras in nonpublic areas to monitor all entrances and exits? 
 PH5 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable Do you plan and coordinate physical 
(facilities) and technical (information systems, mobile devices, or workstations) 
security-related activities (such as testing) before doing such activities to reduce 
the impact on your practice assets and individuals? 
 PH6 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable Have you developed policies and 
procedures that plan for your workforce (and your information technology service 
provider or contracted information technology support) to gain access to your 
facility and its ePHI during a disaster? 
 PH7 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable If a disaster happens, does your practice 
have another way to get into your facility or offsite storage location to get your 
ePHI? 
 PH8 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have policies and procedures for 
the protection of keys, combinations, and similar physical access controls? 
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 PH9 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have policies and procedures 
governing when to re-key locks or change combinations when, for example, a 
key is lost, a combination is compromised, or a workforce member is transferred 
or terminated? 
 PH10 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have a written facility security 
plan? 
 PH11 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you take the steps necessary to 
implement your facility security plan? 
 PH12 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you have a Facility User Access List 
of workforce members, business associates, and others who are authorized to 
access your facilities where ePHI and related information systems are located? 
 PH13 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you periodically review and approve 
a Facility User Access List and authorization privileges, removing from the 
Access List personnel no longer requiring access? 
 PH14 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice have procedures to 
control and validate someone’s access to your facilities based on that person’s 
role or job duties? 
 PH15 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you have procedures to create, 
maintain, and keep a log of who accesses your facilities (including visitors), when 
the access occurred, and the reason for the access? 
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 PH16 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Has your practice determined whether 
monitoring equipment is needed to enforce your facility access control policies 
and procedures? 
 PH17 - §164.310(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Do you have maintenance records that 
include the history of physical changes, upgrades, and other modifications for 
your facilities and the rooms where information systems and ePHI are kept? 
 PH18 - §164.310(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Do you have a process to document the 
repairs and modifications made to the physical security features that protect the 
facility, administrative offices, and treatment areas? 
 PH19 - §164.310(b) Standard Does your practice keep an inventory and a 
location record of all of its workstation devices? 
 PH20 - §164.310(b) Standard Has your practice developed and implemented 
workstation use policies and procedures? 
 PH21 - §164.310(b) Standard Has your practice documented how staff, 
employees, workforce members, and non-employees access your workstations? 
 PH22 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
that describe how to prevent unauthorized access of unattended workstations? 
 PH23 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures 
that describe how to position workstations to limit the ability of unauthorized 
individuals to view ePHI? 
 PH24 - §164.310(c) Standard Have you put any of your practice's workstations 
in public areas? 
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 PH25 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice use laptops and tablets as 
workstations? If so, does your practice have specific policies and procedures to 
safeguard these workstations? 
 PH26 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have physical protections in 
place to secure your workstations? 
 PH27 - §164.310(c) Standard Do you regularly review your workstations’ 
locations to see which areas are more vulnerable to unauthorized use, theft, or 
viewing of the data?  
 PH28 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have physical protections and 
other security measures to reduce the chance for inappropriate access of ePHI 
through workstations? This could include using locked doors, screen barriers, 
cameras, and guards.  
 PH29 - §164.310(c) Standard Do your policies and procedures set standards for 
workstations that are allowed to be used outside of your facility? 
 PH30 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Does your practice have security policies and 
procedures to physically protect and securely store electronic devices and media 
inside your facility(ies) until they can be securely disposed of or destroyed? 
 PH31 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Do you remove or destroy ePHI from 
information technology devices and media prior to disposal of the device? 
 PH32 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Do you maintain records of the movement of 
electronic devices and media inside your facility?  
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 PH33 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Have you developed and implemented policies 
and procedures that specify how your practice should dispose of electronic 
devices and media containing ePHI? 
 PH34 - §164.310(d)(2)(i) Required Do you require that all ePHI is removed from 
equipment and media before you remove the equipment or media from your 
facilities for offsite maintenance or disposal? 
 PH35 - §164.310(d)(2)(ii) Required Do you have procedures that describe how 
your practice should remove ePHI from its storage media/ electronic devices 
before the media is re-used? 
 PH36 - §164.310(d)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice maintain a record of 
movements of hardware and media and the person responsible for the use and 
security of the devices or media containing ePHI outside the facility? 
 PH37 - §164.310(d)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you maintain records of employees 
removing electronic devices and media from your facility that has or can be used 
to access ePHI?  
 PH38 - §164.310(d)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your organization create backup 
files prior to the movement of equipment or media to ensure that data is available 
when it is needed? 
